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INTERPRETING SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST IN NEW 
YORK: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
NEW YORK COUNTY 
 
People v. Luna1 
(decided March 29, 2012) 
 
The Fourth Amendment has been a topic of discussion and a 
focus for debate since its inception.  Throughout history, there has 
been disagreement on how strictly the amendment and its exceptions 
should be applied.  There have been periods of time in which courts 
have applied a strict construction, focusing on protecting individual’s 
rights.2  At other times, courts have applied a loose construction, al-
lowing for more police discretion.3 
New York has further muddied the waters by pursuing its own 
route when it comes to protecting an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.  This was done through the implementation of an exigency re-
quirement, which narrowed the ability to conduct a warrantless 
search incident to arrest.4  This note examines modern search-
incident-to-arrest law in the State of New York, focusing on one re-
cent case, People v. Luna. 
The issue in Luna was to what extent the Fourth Amendment 
protects an individual from searches of his person and effects incident 
to a lawful arrest.  This note analyzes the evolution of the current law 
and compares the federal approach to the New York approach, spe-
cifically in the context of closed containers.  It shows that many 
commentators believe that New York erred in diverging from the 
 
1 No. 5113-08, 2012 WL 1059392 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 29, 2012). 
2 See, e.g., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 669 (1948); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. 
United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931) (finding that a search warrant must first be obtained 
whenever it is reasonably practicable to do so). 
3 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Harris v. United States, 331 
U.S. 145 (1947); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
4 People v. Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (N.Y. 1983). 
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federal approach, and it addresses the criticisms of those critics.  Fi-
nally, this note suggests a framework, which if applied uniformly, 
would result in consistency.  It concludes by discussing the future 
implications of the proposed framework. 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment was created, in large part, as a reac-
tion to the risks that warrantless searches posed to the colonists in 
early America.5  It was designed to serve the important function of 
protecting early colonists against abuse from an oppressive govern-
ment.6  As such, the Fourth Amendment was created to govern all 
searches and seizures carried out by governmental officials.7  The 
Supreme Court imposed a presumptive warrant requirement, where 
any search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless 
justified.8  The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, “a warrant au-
thorized by a neutral and detached judicial officer is a more reliable 
safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a 
law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime.”9  There are, of course, certain circumstances 
 
5 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389 (1914); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
761 (1969). 
6 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761.  See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of 
Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 978-91, for an in-depth history of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
7 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
8 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (reasoning that if the authority to 
decide whether a search may be conducted is placed with law enforcement, without review 
by a disinterested magistrate, it “would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the 
people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.”); Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that subject to several well-delineated exceptions, warrantless 
searches are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment”). 
9 Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (citing Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14); see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 
(1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971) (“The classic statement of 
the policy underlying the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment”). 
2
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where the warrant requirement may be dispensed with.10  As a result, 
the Supreme Court has carved out over twenty exceptions, which al-
low a search to be conducted in the absence of a warrant.11  One such 
example is a search conducted incident to an arrest. 
The Supreme Court’s application of the search-incident-to-
arrest exception has been anything but uniform.  There have been on-
going debates regarding the scope of search authority provided by 
this exception.  The debates center on the interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment, as the framers did not provide instruction on how its 
two separate clauses should be reconciled.  The first clause requires 
that searches and seizures be ‘reasonable,’ and the second clause im-
poses a requirement that all warrants must be supported by probable 
cause.12  This has allowed for two separate views to emerge in re-
gards to search incident to arrest. 
The first view is the reasonableness approach, which finds 
that a lawful arrest is a “reasonable intrusion under the Fourth 
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to arrest 
requires no additional justification.”13  This view is based on the un-
derlying theory that a search is justified because the intrusion is “in 
reality de minimus” compared to the major intrusion of privacy 
caused by the arrest itself.14  This approach draws a bright-line rule 
that is predictable and easy to apply.15  A search is reasonable when it 
accompanies a lawful custodial arrest.16  Thus, the decision to search 
is left entirely to the arresting officer, which provides for greater po-
lice discretion.17 
 
10 Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14-15. 
11 Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 
1473-74 (1985). 
12 Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 3 (2006). 
13 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 
454, 461 (1981). 
14 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *4. 
15 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 159 (1925); but see Belton, 453 U.S. at 464 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (cautioning against this approach, and instead suggesting that 
“courts should carefully consider the facts and circumstances of each search and seizure.”). 
16 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235; see also Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1228 (Jasen, J., concurring) 
(“The only reasonable restriction would be that the search occur in close spatial and temporal 
proximity to the arrest.”). 
17 The Court in Chimel suggested the problem with the reasonableness approach is that its 
argument is “founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of cer-
tain sorts of police conduct, and not on consideration relevant to Fourth Amendment inter-
ests.  Under such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this area would 
approach the evaporation point.”  Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764-65. 
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In contrast, the second approach requires additional justifica-
tion, other than the lawful arrest, before a search may be conducted.  
The warrant-primacy approach takes the view that a warrantless 
search may be conducted only when it is shown that dispensing with 
the warrant requirement was necessary.18  In other words, there must 
be some justification as to why a warrant could not have been ob-
tained prior to the search.  This approach examines the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding a particular search before determining 
whether it was reasonable.19  What has resulted from the two differ-
ing approaches is a pendulum that swings back and forth through his-
tory, granting limited search authority incident to arrest in some cases 
and broader search authority in others. 
II. FEDERAL HISTORY OF SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
The concept of search incident to arrest appears to have first 
been recognized by the Supreme Court in 1914.20  In Weeks v. United 
States,21 the Court seemingly approved of the warrantless search of 
the ‘person’ subject to a lawful arrest.22  In Carroll v. United States,23 
the Court interpreted the reasoning in Weeks to include “whatever is 
found upon his person or in his control.”24  That search authority was 
later expanded to include a search of the person, as well as “the place 
where the arrest is made” in order to obtain evidence of the crime 
committed.25  The Court affirmed this authority in Marron v. United 
States,26 but it later limited the search authority with its decision in 
 
18 People v. Belton, 432 N.E.2d 745, 755 (N.Y. 1982) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (citing 
People v. Brosnan, 298 N.E.2d 78, 86 (N.Y. 1973) (Wachtler, J., dissenting) (“[C]areful 
study of the (Federal) ‘exception’ cases will reveal that the rationale underlying the case 
where the exception was established was not that there was a good reason to search, but that 
there was a good reason why a search warrant could not be obtained.”). 
19 See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 239 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I continue to believe ‘[t]he 
scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some 
point, the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more de-
tached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular 
search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.’ ”) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). 
20 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755. 
21 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
22 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392). 
23 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
24 Id. at 158. 
25 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). 
26 275 U.S. 192 (1927).  The court held that because there was a lawful arrest, the police 
4
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Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States.27  In the latter case, the 
Court found that although there was an “abundance of information” 
at the time of the search to procure a search warrant, the fact that the 
arresting officer had not first obtained a warrant rendered the search 
unlawful.28  This limited interpretation was soon disregarded in Har-
ris v. United States,29 where the defendant was arrested pursuant to an 
arrest warrant based on a forged check.30  The officers arrested the 
defendant in his living room, and then “undertook a thorough search 
of the entire [four-room] apartment” with the intent of recovering ad-
ditional evidence used in the commission of the crime.31  The Court 
found the search permissible as incident to arrest.32 
Within a year, “the pendulum swung again.”33  In Trupiano v. 
United States,34 the Court referred back to the views from Go-Bart, 
and stressed the importance of the warrant-primacy approach when it 
stated, “[i]t is a cardinal rule that . . . law enforcement agents must 
secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably practicable.”35  
Two years later, the Court rejected this rule in United States v. 
Rabinowitz.36  There, it held the test “is not whether it is reasonable to 
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.”37 
In Chimel v. California,38 the Court disagreed and instead 
read the Fourth Amendment “in light of the history that gave rise to 
its words,” which is consistent with the warrant-primacy approach.39  
The Court agreed that it is “entirely reasonable for the arresting of-
ficer” to search the person of the arrestee, as well as the area into 
which the arrestee might reach in order to protect officers from dan-
 
had a right to contemporaneously search the place where the arrest took place without a war-
rant.  Id. at 199. 
27 282 U.S. 344 (1931). 
28 Chimel, 396 U.S. at 757 (citing Go-Bart, 282 U.S. at 358) (noting also that the arrestee 
was not arrested during the commission of the crime). 
29 331 U.S. 145 (1947). 
30 Id. at 148. 
31 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 758 (citing Harris, 331 U.S. at 148). 
32 Harris, 331 U.S. at 155. 
33 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 758. 
34 334 U.S. 669 (1948). 
35 Id. at 705. 
36 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
37 Id. at 66. 
38 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
39 Id. at 760-61 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ger and to preserve evidence from concealment or destruction.40  
However, because the search at issue went beyond that limited area, 
the Court found it was unreasonable.41 
In United States v. Robinson,42 the Court addressed whether 
the search of a closed container fell within the exception.43  There, 
the search involved a cigarette package found in the arrestee’s pocket 
after he was arrested for driving without a license.44  The Court noted 
that “[t]he validity of the search of a person incident to a lawful arrest 
ha[d] been regarded as settled from its first enunciation, and ha[d] 
remained virtually unchallenged until the present case.”45 
That challenge had been presented by the District of Colum-
bia (“D.C.”) Court of Appeals when it held that in order to search a 
cigarette box, there must be some justification other than the lawful 
arrest.46  The D.C. Court of Appeals reasoned that because Robinson 
had been arrested for a driving offense and “there would be no further 
evidence of such a crime to be obtained in a search of the arrestee,” 
the officer was limited to conducting a frisk for weapons.47 
The Supreme Court disagreed and instead followed the rea-
sonableness approach.  A lawful arrest is a “reasonable intrusion un-
der the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search inci-
dent to arrest requires no additional justification.”48  Thus, the Court 
overruled the holding of the D.C. Court of Appeals and found that a 
lawful arrest, which in itself granted the authority to search, justified 
the full search of the person.49  Through this holding, the Court im-
plied that a full search includes not only the search of the person but 
the search of his effects as well—crumpled cigarette boxes included.  
The Court in Robinson held, for the first time, that an unqualified au-
 
40 Id. at 763. 
41 Id. at 768.  After arresting the defendant in his house pursuant to an arrest warrant, “the 
officers then looked through the entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, 
and a small workshop.”  Id. at 753-54. 
42 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
43 Id. at 236. 
44 Id. at 220, 223. 
45 Id. at 224 (including a search of the arrestee as well as the area within his control). 
46 Id. at 227. 
47 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 227. 
48 Id. at 235. 
49 Id. at 235.  The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals conclusion that “the only 
reason supporting the authority for a full search incident to [a] lawful arrest was the possibil-
ity of discovery of evidence or fruits.”  Id. at 233. 
6
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thority exists to search incident to arrest.50 
III. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST IN NEW YORK 
Despite the identical language of the United States and the 
New York State constitutional search and seizure provisions,51 the 
New York Court of Appeals has invoked its power to grant further 
protections to its citizens.  New York’s highest court did so by im-
plementing an exigency requirement, thereby diverging from the fed-
eral search-incident-to-arrest approach. 
When the New York Court of Appeals decided People v. De 
Santis52 in 1978, it was still following the framework provided by the 
Supreme Court.  The Court used a reasonableness approach that 
where an arrest is reasonable, a search of the arrestee and “the area 
within his immediate control” does not require any additional justifi-
cation.53  Based on this premise, the court ruled, “a warrantless 
search, not significantly divorced in time or place from the arrest, is 
lawful.”54 
Several years later, in People v. Belton,55 the court touched 
upon the search-incident-to-arrest exception—this time in conjunc-
tion with the automobile exception.  Here, the search at issue in-
volved the defendant’s jacket located on the back seat of the car, 
where a small amount of cocaine was recovered from inside a zip-
pered pocket.56  In 1980 the case first reached the Court of Appeals, 
which concluded that the search of the zippered pocket was invalid as 
a search incident to arrest because there was no immediate exigen-
cy.57  The People appealed to the United States Supreme Court, 
 
50 Id. at 230 (“Virtually all of the statements of this Court affirming the existence of an 
unqualified authority to search incident to a lawful arrest are dicta.”). 
51 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”), 
with N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
52 385 N.E.2d 577 (N.Y. 1978). 
53 Id. at 579. 
54 Id. at 580. 
55 407 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 1980). 
56 Id. at 421. 
57 Id. at 423. 
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which overruled the Court of Appeals, and found the search valid as 
incident to arrest because there was a lawful custodial arrest and the 
search was conducted contemporaneously.58 
On remand, the Court of Appeals abandoned its earlier ruling 
and upheld the search but for a new reason this time around.59  It 
made clear the search was now upheld via the automobile excep-
tion,60 despite the fact that the Supreme Court did not explore this ex-
ception.61  Moreover, the Court of Appeals did not directly respond to 
the Supreme Court’s holding regarding the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception.62  The ultimate disposition at the state level left an im-
portant issue open for determination: whether a search of a closed 
container may be conducted incident to arrest, even where no exigen-
cy exists, so long as the search is done contemporaneously.63  Thus, 
Belton’s unique procedural history allowed New York to carve its 
own path.64  What resulted was a substantive impact on search inci-
dent to arrest law in the State of New York. 
In People v. Smith,65 the New York Court of Appeals re-
sponded by adding an exigency requirement, thereby limiting De 
Santis and narrowing the search-incident-to-arrest exception.  Under 
the State Constitution, 
A person’s privacy interest in a closed container readi-
ly accessible to him may become subordinate to the 
need of the People, under exigent circumstances, to 
search it for weapons or evidence that otherwise might 
be secreted or destroyed . . . .  [The] container may not 
be searched for a weapon or evidence if it is apparent 
that it is so securely fastened that the person arrested 
 
58 Belton, 453 U.S. at 462-63. 
59 Belton, 432 N.E.2d at 746. 
60 Id. (“A majority of this court now concludes that the search which followed defendant’s 
lawful arrest was permissible under the State Constitution under the automobile exception to 
the warrant requirement.”). 
61 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 463 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court does not find it 
necessary to consider the ‘automobile exception’ in its disposition of this case.”). 
62 Belton, 432 N.E.2d at 746 (“We do not find it necessary to consider the Supreme 
Court’s rationale as applied to our Constitution, however, for we now hold on a different ra-
tionale [that the search was valid.]”). 
63 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1226. 
64 The law could have been solidified by the Court of Appeals had it “simply affirm[ed] 
the determination of the Supreme Court on remand, without further comment.”  Belton, 432 
N.E.2d at 748 (Gabrielli, J., concurring). 
65 452 N.E.2d 1224 (N.Y. 1983). 
8
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cannot quickly reach its contents, or the person arrest-
ed makes it unmistakably clear that he will not seek to 
reach the contents, or the container is so small that it 
could not contain a weapon or evidence of the crime.66 
The reasonableness of an officer’s assertion that an exigency exists 
must be measured at the time of the arrest because the justification to 
search will not necessarily dissipate.67  So long as an exigency is pre-
sent at the time of arrest and the subsequent search is “not significant-
ly divorced in time or place from the arrest,” a search may be con-
ducted, regardless of the circumstances existing at the time of the 
search itself.68 
Less than five months later, the Court of Appeals revisited the 
issue in People v. Gokey.69 The court explicitly held that where an ar-
rested individual has a privacy interest in a closed container within 
his reach, a search of that container could only be justified by “the 
safety to the public and the arresting officer; and the protection of ev-
idence from destruction or concealment.”70  Furthermore, the court 
instructed that the prosecution must affirmatively assert the presence 
of an exigency in order to overcome the requirement and justify a 
warrantless search.71 
After Gokey, the Court of Appeals remained silent on the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception in the context of closed containers 
for over three decades.72  Finally, in People v. Jimenez,73 the court re-
addressed the issue.  It found that two separate requirements must be 
met in order for a warrantless search to be justified.74  First, the 
search must be conducted within close space and time from the ar-
 
66 Id. at 1227 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 457 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y. 1983). 
70 Id. at 724-25. 
71 Id. at 725. 
72 During this time, lower court decisions begged, figuratively speaking, for the Court of 
Appeals to revisit the issue.  As will be demonstrated, this necessity arose due to inconsistent 
holdings and criticisms regarding the current state of the law.  See infra notes 79-82 and ac-
companying text; see also infra part VI. 
73 People v. Jimenez, 2014 WL 696481 (N.Y. Feb. 25, 2014).  Due to how recently this 
case was decided, no lower court cases have been decided since.  As such, this article will 
examine the analysis of lower court opinions in light of Smith and Gokey, without taking 
Jimenez into consideration. 
74 Id. at *3. 
9
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rest.75  “The second, and equally important,” requirement is that exi-
gent circumstances must be affirmatively demonstrated.76  However, 
in Jimenez, neither officer asserted a fear for “his safety or the integ-
rity of any destructive evidence,” nor was such a fear objectively rea-
sonable in light of the surrounding circumstances.77  Therefore, the 
court held that the warrantless search was improper.78 
Since Gokey, lower courts in New York have not applied the 
holdings of Smith and Gokey with much uniformity.  In at least one 
instance, the Second Department strictly construed the exigency re-
quirement, and found a search incident to arrest to be unjustified 
where the search was undertaken for reasons other than the need to 
either detect a weapon or evidence of a crime.79  In contrast, the Third 
Department has applied a loose construction, and found the require-
ment satisfied by a blanket assertion that the possibility of an exigen-
cy existed.80  The First Department has applied a strict construction in 
some cases,81 while it referred back to the De Santis-Belton era to ap-
ply a broad, reasonableness approach in others.82 
The judicial history, differing focuses, and inconsistent appli-
cations, make it clear that the current state of law in New York is an-
ything but settled.  The same search-incident-to-arrest exception is 
applied in drastically different fashions, and as a result, outcomes are 
unpredictable.  Hopefully, a more coherent path will be followed in 
light of the Court of Appeals direction provided in Jimenez, however, 
that is yet to be seen.  A closer, in-depth analysis of People v. Luna 
illustrates the need for a more refined approach. 
 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at *3, *4 (“[There must be] reasonable belief that the suspect may gain possession of 
a weapon or be able to destroy evidence located in the bag.”). 
77 Id. at *4, *5. 
78 Jimenez, 2014 WL 696481, at *5. 
79 See People v. Branch, 687 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1999) (“Nor was the 
search a lawful incident to an arrest, as the detectives concededly searched the jacket for 
identification, rather than for a weapon or evidence of a crime.”). 
80 See People v. Schobert, 463 N.Y.S.2d 277, 279 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1983) (discussing 
the validity of the seizure of the defendant at length and then stating, “the exigent circum-
stances, including the possibility that the contraband might be destroyed, justified an imme-
diate arrest and search.”). 
81 See generally People v. Evans, 922 N.Y.S.2d 403 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2011); People v. 
Hendricks, 841 N.Y.S.2d 94 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2007); People v. Rosado, 625 N.Y.S.2d 
162 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1995). 
82 See generally People v. Watkins, 682 N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998); People 
v. Baker, 679 N.Y.S.2d 107 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998); People v. Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d 1 
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1997). 
10
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IV. PEOPLE V. LUNA 
During the summer of 2008, the New York Police Department 
(“NYPD”) initiated an investigation to pursue the principle target of a 
cocaine-dealing operation, a man identified as Kelly.83  That fall, the 
NYPD decided to “take down” the operation and contacted Kelly in 
order to purchase 100 grams of cocaine.84  An undercover officer car-
ried out the transaction, and Detective Macias was instructed to re-
main nearby in an undercover vehicle.85  At the sale location, a white 
taxi drove past the undercover officer’s vehicle and then returned to 
the area.86  Shortly after, the defendant approached the undercover of-
ficer’s vehicle and knocked on the window; the undercover officer 
rolled down the window and asked, “Where’s Kelly?”87  The defend-
ant, later identified as Antonio Luna,88 pointed in the direction of the 
parked taxi.89  Macias moved in to apprehend Luna, identifying him-
self as a police officer and displaying his shield as he approached.90  
After facing Luna, Macias noticed a cigarette box in Luna’s hands.91  
Macias handcuffed Luna’s hands behind his back, took the cigarette 
box from Luna’s hands, conducted a quick pat down, and searched 
the cigarette box.92  Inside the box, Macias found cocaine in a clear 
plastic bag.93 
The court first addressed whether probable cause existed to 
 
83 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *1. 
84 Id. at *2.  Prior to this occasion, the police had purchased cocaine approximately five 
times from Kelly and those working with him.  Id. at *1.  The individuals acted in various 
capacities, such as deliverers, lookouts, and handlers of money.  Id.  Although Kelly was not 
present at each transaction, he had some degree of participation in each, for example, 
knowledge that each transaction occurred.  Id. 
85 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *2. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 At the time of the “take down,” Luna was not known to be involved with the drug oper-
ation, and neither the undercover officer nor the lead investigator recognized him.  Id.  How-
ever, the investigation team was first introduced to Luna prior to the initial purchase of co-
caine from Kelly.  Id.  Luna and Kelly had been walking on the street when the police 
stopped them in order to “obtain the identity of Kelly and the person he was with at the 
time.”  Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *2.  During this encounter, Kelly identified himself as 
Kelly Gomez, and Luna identified himself as Antonio Luna.  Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at *3. 
91 Id. 
92 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *3. 
93 Id. 
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carry out the arrest.94  Next, it discussed the governing law in New 
York concerning the search at hand.95  At the outset, the court reiter-
ated the principle that a warrantless search conducted incident to ar-
rest is only permissible in certain circumstances.96  It then immediate-
ly made reference to the Robinson-De Santis rationale that a search 
incident to arrest is justified because the intrusion is “in reality de 
minimus” compared to the major intrusion of privacy caused by the 
arrest itself.97  Despite this “core rationale,” the court acknowledged 
that the New York Constitution requires exigent circumstances.98 
The court pointed to Gokey as the decision that “diverged 
from federal constitutional law” and shed light on how the added exi-
gency requirement led to inconsistent applications.99  It referred to 
Rosado, Hendricks, and Evans, to display disagreement with the strict 
application approach.100  It cited to Wylie, Watkins, and Baker to 
demonstrate the approach focused on timing and exclusive control.101 
The court in Luna discussed three cases dealing with the 
search of a cigarette box.102  In People v. Thompson,103 the search was 
upheld because the box had not been in the exclusive control of the 
police, the search occurred in close space and time, and the officer 
had a reasonable fear for safety, without explaining how.104  In Peo-
ple v. Schobert,105 the court upheld the search of a gold cigarette case, 
stating it was justified by exigent circumstances but never actually 
explained the exigency.106  In People v. Allen,107 the warrantless 
search of a cigarette box was found invalid because there were no ex-
 
94 Id. at *3-4.  For purposes of this article, because it is focused on search incident to ar-
rest, the validity of the arrest is not contested.  However, it is important to note that Luna 
was arrested based on “probable cause to believe he was a participant in the arranged sale of 
narcotics between Kelly and [the undercover officer].”  Id. at *4. 
95 Id. 
96 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *4. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at *5 (displaying disagreement with the notion that a higher privacy interest attach-
es when a closed container is involved). 
101 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *6. 
102 Id. 
103 703 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2000). 
104 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7 (citing Thompson, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 149). 
105 463 N.Y.S.2d 277 (App Div. 3d Dep’t 1983). 
106 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7 (“The Court did not explain why this exigency allowed 
the search of the cigarette case at the police station.”) (citing Schobert, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 279). 
107 675 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Crim. Ct. 1998). 
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igent circumstances; therefore, there was no reason why a warrant 
could not first be obtained.108 
Like many other courts, the court in Luna applied its own var-
iation of the exigency requirement to conclude that the search was 
valid.  It found that the circumstances surrounding Luna’s arrest justi-
fied the police’s reasonable belief that the container possibly con-
tained narcotics109 and that Luna “could easily have taken steps to de-
stroy or conceal the contents of the cigarette box.”110  To support this 
inference, the court noted several facts: Luna initially demonstrated 
resistance upon arrest;111 Luna continued to hold the box in his hands, 
even as he was handcuffed; and at the time of arrest, Detective 
Macias and Luna were alone on the street.112  Further, “before, dur-
ing, and immediately after” Luna’s arrest, Detective Macias was in a 
position of vulnerability because Macias “placed his arm through Lu-
na’s handcuffed arms to prevent him from escaping.”113  Therefore, 
the circumstances presented the need to protect officer safety because 
Macias was “in a position where he could easily have been physically 
assaulted” by Luna.114  Finally, the court justified the search because 
it took place “in close spatial and temporal proximity” to Luna’s ar-
rest.115  Based on those reasons, the court found that the search of the 
contents of the cigarette box was lawful and valid.116 
The court in Luna concluded its opinion with a lengthy dis-
play of its discontent with the current state of search-incident-to-
arrest law in New York, “with the hope that such thoughts might 
make some contribution to the development of the law in this im-
portant area.”117  The court emphasized its viewpoint that New York 
 
108 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7 (quoting Allen, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 485, 486). 
109 Id. (stating that Luna was present at the scene because of his participation in the 
planned narcotics transaction, and the cigarette box was held in his hands). 
110 Id. 
111 Id.  The court was referring to the fact that Luna was “initially a ‘little resistant’ and 
‘tensed up’ when Detective Macias identified himself as a police officer,” and Luna failed to 
comply with Macias when he ordered Luna to turn around.  Id. at *3.  Interestingly, the court 
cited to People v. Doe as support, despite the fact that there, the defendant was “subdued by 
police after a struggle.”  Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7; People v. Doe, 711 N.Y.S.2d 1, 1 
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2000). 
112 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at *8. 
117 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *8. 
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erred in diverging from the federal approach and gave a list of 
“anomalies and problems” which have resulted.118  It concluded that 
the exigency requirement created significant negative consequences 
because it is hard to apply, invites arbitrary rulings, and promotes 
counterproductive incentives.119 
V. PAST: THE HISTORY OF NEW YORK’S DEPARTURE FROM 
THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
When discussing the opinion that New York should not have 
deviated from the federal approach, the court in Luna is not alone; 
other courts and judges agree.120  However, in order to determine 
whether the Court of Appeals erred in departing from the federal ap-
proach, a full understanding of why it diverged is crucial. 
The vague language of the Fourth Amendment has led to two 
competing theories on how warrantless searches should be analyzed.  
It is no secret that federal courts follow the reasonableness approach, 
where an arrest provides authority to search without further justifica-
tion.121  In New York, on the other hand, the notion of adopting the 
more restrictive warrant-primacy approach was alluded to as early as 
De Santis.122  In Belton, the Court of Appeals neither rejected nor ac-
cepted the Supreme Court’s approach expressly; however, it did im-
ply that a warrantless search incident to arrest must be justified by ei-
ther the need to preserve evidence relating to the crime, or the need to 
dispel danger.123 
In Smith, the Court of Appeals instructed for the first time that 
the Federal and New York State warrant requirement provisions are 
to be measured differently.  It implied disagreement with the Su-
preme Court’s “bright line” reasonableness interpretation by noting 
 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at *10. 
120 Id. at *11; see also Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1228 (Jasen, J., concurring) (“I perceive no 
rationale for creating a different standard under the State Constitution than currently exists 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”). 
121 See, e.g., Robinson, 414 U.S. at 233 (rejecting the D.C Court of Appeals holding that 
there must be some justification other than the lawful arrest to conduct the search).  A lawful 
arrest is a “reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a 
search incident to arrest requires no additional justification.”  Id. at 235. 
122 De Santis, 385 N.E.2d at 580.  While considering Chadwick, the court stated, “[u]nder 
these circumstances, there was no reason whatsoever which would justify a delay of the 
search until a warrant could be obtained.”  Id. 
123 Belton, 432 N.E.2d at 748. 
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that the means, which “occasionally [] forbid a reasonable search or 
permit an unreasonable one,” are justified in the name of efficien-
cy.124  “The State Constitution, however, has not been read so broad-
ly.”125  Rather, it has been interpreted to require that the validity of 
each search be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the sur-
rounding circumstances.126  Further, by implementing the exigency 
requirement, which makes a warrantless search of a closed container 
invalid unless justified by something more than the arrest, the Court 
of Appeals adopted the warrant-primacy approach.  This approach 
leaves the “reasonable” determination to a neutral judge, not a law 
enforcement officer; as a result, it is more restrictive on police activi-
ty.  The means, which are less efficient or predictable, are justified in 
the name of heightened constitutional protection. 
As a result, New York opted to provide greater protection 
than the federal approach, a move entirely within the bounds of the 
“fundamental principle of Federalism.”127  The Federal Constitution 
creates “only a base level of protection for individual’s rights and 
[New York] is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater re-
strictions on police activity.”128  Pursuant to that authority, New York 
did just that, with the purpose of providing more protection to indi-
viduals. 
VI. PRESENT: HOW WE GOT HERE 
The result of New York State’s departure, as the court in Luna 
accurately stated, is a “confusing landscape of decisional law which 
is difficult to apply.”129  However, an easy-to-apply approach can be 
attained without resorting back to the federal approach, which would 
relinquish New York’s desire to provide heightened protection.  In 
fact, the court in Smith intended to do just that, but instead of follow-
ing Smith’s instruction, lower courts challenged it by refusing to ac-
cept that higher protection should be afforded.  The result has been 
years of misinterpretation of what we should have learned from the 
Court of Appeals.  For these reasons, the criticisms enumerated in 
 
124 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1226. 
125 Id. at 1227. 
126 Id. at 1226-27. 
127 Belton, 432 N.E.2d at 751 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). 
128 Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
129 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *11. 
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Luna are misguided because they should be aimed at the lower courts 
for not consistently developing the law handed down by Smith and 
Gokey in its intended fashion.  However, one cannot blame the court 
in Luna for this mistake; courts had been misinterpreting and misap-
plying the holdings of Smith and Gokey long before Antonio Luna 
ever stepped foot into that New York County Courthouse. 
A. Argument: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Should not Differ Based on Whether an Item Is in 
a Container 
Luna criticized New York’s application of search incident to 
arrest law because it unreasonably places a higher expectation of pri-
vacy in an item simply because of its location within a container.130  
The court displayed strong resistance to the notion that reasonable 
expectations of privacy differ depending on whether a closed con-
tainer is involved.131  This view is in line with New York v. Belton,132 
which placed no emphasis on the privacy interest associated with 
closed containers.133 
The New York Court of Appeals first shed light on the im-
portance of a container in a search-incident-to-arrest analysis in De 
Santis.  The court recognized that a privacy right remains in a con-
tainer, even after arrest, unless there is a “legitimate governmental in-
terest” in the need for protection of safety or from destruction of evi-
dence.134  From there, the importance placed on a closed container 
grew exponentially.  In Smith, the court stated, “[a]lthough probable 
cause to [arrest] will justify the search of his person, it will not neces-
sarily justify the search of a container readily accessible to him.”135  
By emphasizing the term ‘closed container,’ the court indicated that 
an arrestee’s privacy interest to be secure from unreasonable searches 
 
130 Id. at *8. 
131 Id. 
132 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
133 Id. at 460.  Despite the fact that the Supreme Court did not place emphasis on whether 
a closed container was involved, the New York Court of Appeals on remand advanced the 
position that there should exist a privacy interest in a container when it stated, “the State 
Constitution protects the privacy interest of the people . . . not only in their persons, but in 
their houses, papers and effects as well, against the unfettered discretion of government offi-
cials to search or seize.”  Belton, 432 N.E.2d at 746 (emphasis added). 
134 De Santis, 385 N.E.2d at 580 (“To be sure, the arrest of [the] defendant, standing 
alone, did not destroy whatever privacy interests he had in the contents of the suitcase.”). 
135 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1227 (internal citation omitted). 
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and seizures is distinguishable when it comes to his ‘person’ versus 
his ‘effects.’ 
In Luna, the court believed the heightened privacy approach 
“assigns distinctions of constitutional significance . . . to facts which 
have little relevance to the reasonable expectations of privacy which 
people rely upon in their daily lives.”136  This was supported by the 
theory that an individual does not put something within a container 
with the intent to provide “an additional layer of privacy.”137  Rather, 
items are placed within a container for other reasons.138  One reason 
provided was that “[a] person might wrap small objects in paper to 
shield them from view when they are removed from a pocket.”139  
However, if one puts an item in a container in order to “shield it from 
view” once that item is removed from a pocket or backpack, would 
that not indicate the intent to provide “an additional layer of priva-
cy?”  At the very least, it demonstrates the intent to keep the contents 
private from public view. 
Luna’s argument is persuasive with regard to the other exam-
ples given—coins and cigarettes–that those items are not put in a 
container to provide more privacy.  However, an approach that places 
a higher or lower privacy interest on a container depending on what it 
looks like on the outside would be troublesome.  The fact that a per-
son possesses a change purse or cigarette box does not necessarily 
mean coins or cigarettes are located within that container.  A coin 
purse, in particular, can be used to hold any number of items. 
Where there is a heightened privacy interest associated with a 
closed container, the argument to shift away from the reasonableness 
approach gains strength.  That theory associates a higher invasion of 
privacy with the initial arrest than it does with the subsequent search.  
It cannot be disputed that an arrest is intrusive.  However, by placing 
emphasis on the closed container, New York has made clear it finds 
the invasion of privacy greater when the contents of a closed contain-
er are searched than it does, not only when an arrest occurs, but also 
when a search of the person of the arrestee is conducted. 
This belief, that the search is more intrusive than the arrest it-
self, is not without merit.  The search of a closed container found on 
 
136 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *8. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. (stating that a container may be used to keep items together, or make them easier to 
access, or because that is how something is normally sold or kept, for example, cigarettes). 
139 Id. 
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an individual’s person has the potential to be immensely intrusive, 
depending on what an individual decides to carry day-to-day.  Socie-
tal changes over the past decade have led people to carry more pri-
vate, personal items on them than they had in the past.  Women keep 
feminine products in small containers.  Advancing technology has al-
lowed businessmen to carry volumes of private information and doc-
uments on their person.  A search of these types of containers, where 
a person specifically intended to provide an “additional layer of pri-
vacy,” has the potential to be extremely intrusive and even embar-
rassing. 
The intrusiveness of the search could be greater depending on 
the circumstances surrounding an arrest.  Arrests generally take place 
in public, and it is not uncommon for an arrestee to be accompanied 
by others.  A search of a closed container in that instance would ex-
pose the contents not only to the arresting officer, but also to anyone 
else close enough to observe what is transpiring.  The problem is that 
the actual contents of a container will never be known until it is 
opened, at which point the privacy interest has been destroyed, and 
the bell cannot be un-rung. 
B. Misconception: What Exactly Must Present the 
Exigency 
The arrestee?  The circumstances?  The container?  Looking 
at lower court decisions, the answer is unclear.  According to Luna, 
the arresting officer’s behavior can create an exigency.140  However, 
Smith had already given us the answer. 
The heightened privacy interest associated with a closed con-
tainer can only be overcome by “exigent circumstances, to search it 
for weapons or evidence that otherwise might be destroyed.”141  The 
court’s language provides a reasonable inference that a search may be 
conducted where: (1) the container is not securely fastened by the po-
lice and the arrestee could “quickly reach its contents,” (2) the actions 
of the arrestee provide reason to believe he may attempt to reach its 
contents, and (3) the container is of a size large enough to hold a 
 
140 Id. at *7 (“[Because Detective Macias] placed his arm through Mr. Luna’s handcuffed 
arms to prevent him from escaping[,] Detective Macias was thus in a position where he 
could easily have been physically assaulted by [Luna] . . . .”). 
141 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1227 (emphasis added). 
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weapon or evidence of the crime.142  The Appellate Division in Peo-
ple v. Rosado143 made the same point but in more explicit terms.  “A 
search incident to arrest [] may only extend to closed containers with-
in the defendant’s possession or control when there is some reasona-
ble basis for the belief that the contents of those containers” present 
an exigency.144 
Although case law instructs that the contents must pose the 
exigency, this must nonetheless be the rule in order for the require-
ment to stand true to its purpose—that the privacy interest in a closed 
container can only be overcome by the need to dispel an exigency.  
Common sense dictates that if a container does not present an exi-
gency, a search of that container will not dispel an exigency.  As an 
illustration, take Luna’s assertion that Detective Macias’ safety was 
at issue because he placed his arms through Luna’s handcuffs.145  As-
suming the inquiry was whether an exigency existed, rather than 
whether the contents posed an exigency, Macias would be justified in 
searching the cigarette box because it is clear the exposure to physi-
cal assault presented an exigent circumstance.  But in practical terms, 
what would a search of the box solve?  If Macias’ arms were still 
through the handcuffs, the exigency would remain even after he 
flipped open the top of the box.  In other words, a search of the ciga-
rette box would, in no way, reduce the risk of physical assault. 
C. Misconception: The Exigency Requirement Is 
Easily Satisfied 
Obviously, the exigency requirements have been applied with 
different degrees of scrutiny.  Some lower courts have applied a strict 
construction, finding an exigency must be asserted.146  In contrast, 
others have allowed an exigency to be inferred by the facts.147  In 
 
142 Id. (emphasis added). 
143 625 N.Y.S.2d 162 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1995). 
144 Id. (emphasis added) 
145 See supra text accompanying note 140. 
146 See Rosado, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 162 (finding the requirement unsatisfied because “[n]o 
one, and most notably not the arresting officer,” suggested the container may hold a weapon 
or that a search was necessary to preserve evidence).  Similarly, in Evans, there was no indi-
cation of fear by the officer and no assertion of how any potential evidence could have been 
destroyed.  Evans, 922 N.Y.S.2d at 405. 
147 See, e.g., Watkins, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 40 (finding the exigency requirement satisfied be-
cause the search was done in close space and time and the “requisite exigency was readily 
inferable”). 
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Thompson, the court accepted a blanket assertion that an exigency ex-
isted, without analyzing the assertion in light of the facts.148  In other 
cases, courts have found the possibility that an exigency might exist 
sufficient.149 
However, the decision in Smith, through its language and ap-
plication, implied that the requirements be strictly construed and ex-
plained.  First, it instructed that the circumstances justifying the 
search must be considered at the time of the arrest.150  This indicates 
that the justification provided can be subject to dispute and must be 
able to withstand scrutiny.  Further, through its relatively lengthy ap-
plication, the court gave an explanation as to why the need to protect 
officer safety was present,151 leaving the assertion unchallengeable. 
As early as Gokey, the Court of Appeals instructed that the 
reasonableness of an officer’s justification for dispensing with the 
warrant requirement must be judged in light of the circumstances ex-
isting at the time of the arrest.152  By giving instruction on when the 
reasonableness of the justification must be considered, it would fol-
low that a reason must be given.  Jimenez added that although “an of-
ficer need not affirmatively testify as to the safety concerns” posed 
by the exigency, the exigency “must be affirmatively demonstrat-
ed.”153  There must be a “robust evidentiary showing” to satisfy the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception.154 
However, some courts treat the exigency requirement as self-
executing and instead focus on the timing of the search.155  As a re-
sult, the requirement becomes a legal fiction because it is, in essence, 
always satisfied.  A closer look at People v. Wylie156 demonstrates 
how this flawed approach came to fruition. 
At the outset, the court implied that the only relevant inquiry 
was whether the search was done close in space and time, as per Bel-
 
148 Thompson, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 149 (“[T]he record reveals that the officer had a reasona-
ble fear for his safety and that exigent circumstances remained at the time the box was 
searched.”). 
149 See supra note 80 and accompanying text; see also Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 4. 
150 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1227. 
151 Id. at 1227-28. 
152 Gokey, 457 N.E.2d at 725. 
153 Jimenez, 2014 WL 696481, at *4. 
154 Id. at *5. 
155 See generally Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d 1; Watkins, 682 N.Y.S.2d 40; Schobert, 463 
N.Y.S.2d 277; Baker, 679 N.Y.S.2d 107. 
156 666 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1997). 
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ton and De Santis.157  It applied the Belton rule that a search is valid 
so long as it “closely follows the arrest” and cited to De Santis’ ‘de 
minimus’ rationale in support.158  The court compared the facts before 
it with the facts from De Santis because the two searches were “mate-
rially indistinguishable” and found that the search occurred immedi-
ately.159 
Exigent circumstances were eventually addressed,160 but not 
in conformity with the three steps set forth by Smith.  The third 
prong, which considers the size of the container, was undisputed be-
cause the search involved a plastic bag large enough to conceal a 
weapon.161  As to the first prong—whether the arrestee could have 
accessed the container—the court determined that because the con-
tainer was not in the exclusive control of the police, the arrestee “eas-
ily could have reached for a weapon.”162  According to this reasoning, 
the first prong will always be satisfied so long as the container is not 
within the exclusive control of the police, even if the arrestee has 
been handcuffed.  Regarding the second prong—whether the ar-
restee’s actions provided reason to believe he may attempt to reach 
the container—the court never referenced specific, articulable actions 
undertaken by Wylie.  Instead, it generally stated, 
[A] determined arrestee may use means other than his 
hands—such as kicking or shoving the arresting of-
ficer—to disrupt the arrest process in order to gain a 
weapon or destroy evidence.  Such actions are a realis-
tic possibility when the search occurs within close 
proximity to the arrest, as was the case here.163 
After the court established the search was reasonable, it discussed the 
preservation of evidence prong.164 
The approach utilized by the court in Wylie is misguided for 
 
157 Id. at 3. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 4.  The court alluded to exigencies, without ever actually mentioning the term. 
161 The bag itself was evidence of a theft, so there was reason to believe it may contain 
further evidence of the crime for which the arrest was based.  Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 4. 
162 Id. at 4.  The defendant argued that despite the close space and time, any exigency was 
dispelled once he was handcuffed.  Id. at 3.  The court disagreed and cited De Santis as the 
“governing standard,” which asks, “whether the property has been reduced to the ‘exclusive 
control’ of the police.”  Id. at 4. 
163 Id. 
164 Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 4. 
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several reasons.  First, it failed to abide by the rule of precedent.  Bel-
ton and De Santis, although often referred to for background and in-
sight, should not have been cited to for applicable law after Smith and 
Gokey because the latter materially distinguished and limited the 
holdings of the former.  Instead, the court in Wylie only applied por-
tions of Smith—the portions that discussed timing—in combination 
with Belton.165  As a result, it inaccurately bolstered Belton’s ‘close 
space and time’ aspect to provide the impression that, because an ex-
igency could remain throughout the process of an arrest, the only real 
inquiry is whether the search happened immediately.  The court in 
Wylie seemed to have missed Smith’s instruction that “[t]here must, 
however, be circumstances at the time of the arrest justifying the 
search.”166  Therefore, when Smith is read as a whole, it provides that 
when an exigency is present, the subsequent search must be conduct-
ed close in space and time.  Instead, the court in Wylie advanced a 
drastically different premise, that where a search is done in close 
space and time, an exigency will always be present. 
Under this approach, the exigency requirement is always sat-
isfied, simply because of the hostile nature of an arrest.167  The court 
made this point itself by stating, “a determined arrestee may use 
means other than his hands” to create a danger.168  It took the position 
that an arrest is inherently an emergency circumstance, and an ar-
restee can always pose a threat, even if handcuffed.169  In turn, this 
approach also misconstrues what may provide search authority.  The 
court in Wylie never explained why the search of the container was 
immediately necessary, but it instead attempted to use the surround-
ing circumstances to demonstrate urgency.170  The misplaced focus 
here is perplexing because the court devoted a portion of its opinion 
to discussing the importance of the bag being classified as a ‘closed 
container.’171 
 
165 Id. at 3, 4. 
166 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1227. 
167 See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 773-74 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“An arrest itself may often 
create an emergency situation . . . .”). 
168 Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 4. 
169 Id. 
170 Id.  The court found a likelihood that the container may contain “further evidence of 
the crime,” but it never explained how that presented the need to search in order to protect 
the contents from destruction or concealment.  Id. 
171 On appeal, the People argued that the evidence did not establish the bag was closed or 
sealed; therefore, the defendant did not have a privacy right in the bag.  Id. at 2.  Although 
the court agreed, the People had not raised the issue at the suppression hearing and were, 
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Although the outcome of Wylie, which found the search valid, 
is not contested, the framework applied to reach that conclusion was 
misguided and could have negative consequences under other cir-
cumstances.  This new test would allow the exigency requirement to 
be satisfied across the board, and the only consideration would be 
whether the search took place in close space and time, a decision that 
remains entirely with the arresting officer. 
VII. FUTURE: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: A SUGGESTION 
The New York Constitution has been interpreted to “require 
that the reasonableness of each search . . . be determined on the basis 
of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”172  This implies 
the need for a particularized, case-by-case analysis.  In order to re-
main true to the State Constitution and the Court of Appeal’s desire 
to afford heightened protection, there is only one option when it 
comes to bright-line rules: no more bright-line rules.  A suggestion on 
how the framework should be applied is necessary. 
Distinction must remain between the search of an arrestee’s 
‘person’ and a search of his or her ‘effects.’173  Therefore, the initial 
consideration should be whether the intended search involves a 
closed container found on or within the “immediate control” of the 
arrestee.174  If it does not, this framework need not be considered.  If 
it does, Smith tells us there is a higher privacy interest involved.  Be-
cause the search in Luna involved a cigarette box, found on Luna’s 
person at the time of the arrest, the heightened privacy interest ap-
plied.175  From there, two separate requirements must be met: (1) exi-
gent circumstances must be “affirmatively demonstrated;” and (2) the 
arrest and search must be done contemporaneously.176 
Exigent circumstances can be demonstrated in one of two 
ways: as either the need to protect “the safety of the public and the 
arresting officer”, or as the need to “protect[ ] evidence from destruc-
tion or concealment.”177  The critical question must be whether the 
 
thus, precluded from raising the issue on appeal.  Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 2-3. 
172 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1226-27. 
173 Id. at 1227. 
174 31 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 481 (2014). 
175 See Allen, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 486 (“Defendant’s cigarette box was undeniably a closed 
container in which he had a privacy expectation for constitutional purposes.”). 
176 Jimenez, 2014 WL 696481, at *3, *4. 
177 Id. 
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container or its contents present an exigency.178  In order to satisfy 
this requirement, there must be an affirmative assertion that an im-
mediate search of the container was necessary, and the reasonable-
ness of that assertion is to be judged at the time of the arrest.  There-
fore, in Luna, the inquiry would end here unless there was a 
reasonable assertion that the cigarette box posed a threat.  Detective 
Macias admitted that “he looked in the cigarette box to see if there 
were narcotics inside,” and the court found that there was “a reasona-
ble belief that the cigarette box [ ] might contain narcotics.179  Argua-
bly, the fact that the cigarette box might contain narcotics allows the 
court to consider whether the threat posed by the container amounted 
to an exigency. 
The court should consider first whether the container is large 
enough to hold a weapon.  If it is, consider the crime for which the 
arrest was made.  An arrest based on a violent crime involving a 
weapon may, by itself, provide the need to search a container.180  An 
arrest based on a violent crime not involving a weapon will not pro-
vide search authority itself but could increase the need to conduct a 
search.181  Where the crime was non-violent, the surrounding circum-
stances could enhance the need to search.182  Assuming the container 
posed a threat to safety, only then should an officer consider the ar-
restee’s behavior and actions, specifically whether they provide rea-
son to believe the arrestee may attempt to reach the container.  If the 
arrestee demonstrates resistance or does not cooperate with the of-
ficer, the need to search would increase.  For purposes of analyzing 
Luna, this line of inquiry is irrelevant because although Macias “was 
initially concerned that [Luna] might be armed,” he did not allege, or 
even believe, that there might be a weapon inside the cigarette box.183 
If the container is not large enough to hold a weapon, the fo-
 
178 Rosado, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 162; Hendricks, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 96-97. 
179 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *3, *7. 
180 Jimenez, 2014 WL 696481, at *4 (citing People v. Johnson, 449 N.Y.S.2d 41, 42 (App. 
Div. 1st Dep’t 1982) (noting the defendant struck the victim in the head with a gun and 
threatened to shoot him)). 
181 See, e.g., Gokey, 457 N.E.2d at 725 (taking into consideration the fact that the defend-
ant was arrested for two nonviolent crimes). 
182 See, e.g., Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1224.  Smith was arrested for jumping a subway turnstile 
without paying the fare and wearing a bulletproof vest.  Id. at 1225-26.  The briefcase Smith 
had been carrying presented the need for protection of safety, because it was large enough to 
contain a weapon, and although the defendant’s crime was not one that would be suggestive 
of a weapon, he was wearing a bulletproof vest, which enhanced suspicion.  Id. at 1227. 
183 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *3. 
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cus must switch to preserving evidence.  Obviously, the container 
must be capable of enclosing the evidence sought, and that evidence 
must, in some way, be connected to the crime for which the defend-
ant was arrested.  Otherwise, the arresting officer could simply use 
the arrest as a basis to conduct an unlimited search in hopes of find-
ing unrelated evidence or more proof of criminality.  In People v. 
Hendricks,184 the court noted that the fact that the arrest took place in 
a drug-prone apartment alone was insufficient, and because the de-
fendant was arrested for trespassing, it would be “difficult to imag-
ine” what evidence could have existed in connection with that specif-
ic crime.185  In a different opinion, the First Department stated that a 
search motivated by the arresting officer’s intent to find and retrieve 
new evidence or contraband, “would be manifestly inadequate as a 
predicate” to search incident to arrest.186 
Unlike the arrest for trespass in Hendricks, the arrest in Luna 
involved the sale of drugs, and therefore the evidence sought by 
Macias—the narcotics believed to be inside the container—was con-
nected to the crime for which the arrest was based.  However, it can 
be argued that the container at issue was not large enough to hold the 
alleged evidence connected to the crime, because Detective Macias 
admitted “[h]e did not believe that the planned sale of 100 grams of 
cocaine would fit inside the cigarette box.”187 
In People v. Ortiz,188 the search of a package found on the ar-
restee was deemed justified “for the purposes of ‘the protection of ev-
idence from destruction or concealment.’ ”189  There, police saw the 
defendant hide “his drug supply on his person” during an observed 
sale of drugs.190  In contrast, Luna held the box in his hands through-
out the course of the arrest, and therefore made no attempt to hide the 
container or its contents.  Instead, the police in Luna merely had rea-
son to believe that he might have been concealing something. 
In Allen, even where the defendant made an attempt to con-
ceal the cigarette box at issue, the search was found improper.191  
 
184 841 N.Y.S.2d 94 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2007). 
185 Id. at 97. 
186 Rosado, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 162 (referring to the People’s speculation that the search was 
motivated by “the arresting officer’s desire to retrieve and safeguard marked buy money”). 
187 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *3. 
188 593 N.Y.S.2d 6 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1993). 
189 Id. at 7 (alteration in the original) (quoting Gokey, 457 N.E.2d at 725). 
190 Id. 
191 Allen, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 483, 486. 
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Similar to Luna, the “small and innocuous” container could not have 
presented a concern for safety, and the defendant was handcuffed 
when the search was conducted.192  “Under [those] circumstances, the 
record must demonstrate that despite the compelling restraint of 
handcuffs, [the] defendant retained the capacity to destroy whatever 
evidence was contained in the cigarette box.”193  In Luna, the court 
argued that despite being handcuffed, “the [d]efendant could easily 
have taken steps to destroy or conceal the contents of the cigarette 
box” because the container was not in the exclusive control of the po-
lice.194  Therefore, the court attempted to use the non-exclusivity in 
order to establish the exigency requirement.  This blanket assertion is 
identical to that made in Wylie,195 which cannot be deemed sufficient.  
Further, there was no indication how, or even if, Luna would have 
been able to destroy the evidence despite the “compelling restraint” 
of the handcuffs.196 
The case most comparable to Luna is Rosado, which involved 
the search of a “little change pouch.”197  The small container was 
found on the defendant’s person, and there was no suggestion that the 
container concealed a weapon.198  In Rosado, despite the drug-related 
arrest, the arresting officer admitted that he had not been given any 
indication that Rosado would have drugs on his person.199  Because 
the coin purse did not pose an exigency, the court found the search 
invalid.200  Similarly, despite the fact that Luna was arrested for his 
alleged participation in a drug transaction, Macias had not received 
any indication that Luna would have drugs on him.  In fact, Macias 
did not know Luna had any involvement in the transaction whatsoev-
er until Luna knocked on the window of the undercover vehicle.201  
Therefore, despite the drug-related arrest, it is undisputable that the 
circumstances in Luna did not objectively lead Macias to believe Lu-
na had drugs on his person, let alone in his pack of cigarettes. 
Assuming the exigency prong is satisfied, the court should 
 
192 Id. at 486; Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *3. 
193 Allen, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 486. 
194 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7. 
195 See infra part VI, section C. 
196 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7. 
197 Rosado, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 162. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *2. 
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then consider the “spatial and temporal limitations.”202  The timing 
aspect must be an absolute requirement because if a search is not 
done within a short time from the arrest, there is, by definition, no ex-
igency.203  If an officer holds onto a container for a prolonged period 
of time without opening it, his or her own actions would indicate that 
there was no exigent threat.  In Luna, the record indicated that the 
search of the cigarette box was done in close space and time to the ar-
rest because Macias took only a few steps before looking into the box 
and only a matter of moments had passed.204 
Under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement, a search is no longer ‘incident to arrest’ when the con-
tainer is within the exclusive control of the police.205  Therefore, even 
where a container presents an exigency, if it is no longer accessible 
by the arrestee, it does not fall within the exception because “there 
[is] absolutely no reason” to justify an immediate search without first 
obtaining a warrant.206  In making this determination, courts have 
considered whether the scene of the arrest was secured, taking into 
account the number of officers present.207 
In reaching its decision, the court in Luna mentioned that at 
the time of arrest, Luna and the arresting officer were alone on the 
street.208  However, the court immediately noted that the defendant 
and detective were not, in fact, alone on the street, as there was an 
undercover officer in a vehicle close by.209  Therefore, it was merely 
as far as the defendant was aware that the two were alone on the 
street.  Additionally, it could be argued that the container was not in 
the exclusive control of the police because Luna held the box in his 
hands at the time he was handcuffed and arrested.  However, Detec-
tive Macias conceded on cross-examination that because he patted 
down and handcuffed Luna, and “had possession of the cigarette 
box,” Macias had control of the container so that Luna could not ac-
 
202 Jimenez, 2014 WL 696481, at *3. 
203 Exigent Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictio 
nary/exigent?show=0&t=1398549048 (last visited May 2, 2014) (defining exigent as “re-
quiring immediate aid or action”). 
204 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7-8. 
205 31 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 481 (2014). 
206 Rosado, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 162; Hendricks, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 97. 
207 Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 4. 
208 Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7. 
209 Id. 
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cess it or destroy its contents.210  Therefore, at that point, when Luna 
could no longer destroy any potential evidence and Detective Macias 
was in possession of the cigarette box, there was absolutely no reason 
a warrant could not have first been obtained before the search was 
conducted. 
Under the suggested approach, the facts in Luna demonstrate 
that the search was impermissible.  Although the search was done in 
close space and time, neither the cigarette box nor its contents posed 
an exigency.  Detective Macias admitted he did not believe that Luna 
had a weapon or the 100 grams of cocaine in the cigarette box.211  
Further, not only did Detective Macias have no indication that Luna 
had drugs on his person, he did not even know who Luna was at the 
time of the arrest.212  Even if it were found that an exigency had ex-
isted, at the moment Macias gained exclusive possession of the ciga-
rette box, that exigency was dispelled.  Thus, it was entirely possible 
for Macias to delay the search until a warrant was procured.  For the-
se reasons, the search of the cigarette box in Luna should have been 
found to be invalid. 
VIII. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
To be clear, the suggested approach will not reduce an of-
ficer’s ability to protect him or herself from danger.  Where a con-
tainer is large enough to hold a weapon, and the surrounding circum-
stances indicate a need for protection, an officer may undoubtedly 
conduct a search incident to arrest for protection.  Therefore, the pro-
posed rule maintains an officer’s discretion to search a container pos-
ing a threat to safety, but reduces the officer’s discretion when it 
comes to searching smaller, seemingly harmless containers. 
The proposed rule affords individuals with insight as to the 
extent of their protection.  The rule provides that surrounding circum-
stances may be considered, and no one factor will be dispositive; this 
indicates a sliding scale where privacy can either be reduced or main-
tained.  If an individual commits a violent crime and has a container 
large enough to hold a weapon, it will likely be searched.  If an indi-
vidual resists arrest or does not cooperate with the officer, the likeli-
hood of a search increases.  If the container on an individual’s person 
 
210 Id. at *3. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at *2. 
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is large enough to hold further evidence of the crime for which he or 
she was arrested, the possibility of the search increases. 
A final consideration to take into account is how the different 
search-incident-to-arrest approaches will fare with evolving technol-
ogy.  For the most part, ‘closed container’ cases have arisen in the 
context of purses, paper bags, wallets, and cigarette boxes.  What if, 
instead of carrying a cigarette box in his front coat pocket, Antonio 
Luna was carrying a cell phone or a digital camera?  How much 
search authority for police would be desirable in that closed container 
situation? 
New York has not specifically addressed the issue of whether 
a cell phone may be searched pursuant to the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception.  However, federal courts have, and the circuits have been 
split.  The Fifth Circuit found the search of a cell phone, including 
text messages, could be searched as incident to arrest.213  The Fourth, 
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits agreed.214  The First Circuit reached the 
opposite conclusion, finding a search of cell phone data invalid as in-
cident to arrest.215  The Eleventh Circuit has declined to address the 
issue.216 
Speculating how search incident to arrest jurisprudence will 
evolve in response to advancing technology may make one hesitant 
before giving more power to the police to search and impede on indi-
vidual privacy.  Now, more than ever, individuals carry an immense 
amount of private and personal information in their pockets every 
time they walk out their front door.  Caution should be exercised be-
fore instituting a “bright-line” rule that provides the police with un-
qualified search authority upon arrest.  Rather, it is imperative that a 
framework be adopted that is flexible enough to emerge with chang-
 
213 United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 711-12 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. 
Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007)). 
214 Id. at 712. 
215 United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[the court was not convinced] 
that such a search is ever necessary to protect arresting officers or preserve destructible evi-
dence.”).  Thus, it appears the court applied a framework more akin to the New York ap-
proach than the traditional Federal approach allowing an unqualified search authority.  Id.  It 
did so by strictly construing the justifications put forth in Chimel that allowed for the search-
incident-to-arrest exception.  Id. 
216 United States v. Chaidez-Reyes, 1:13-CR-158-0DE-AJB, 2014 WL 547178, at *11 
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2014) (quoting United States v. Allen, 416 F. App’x 21, 27 (11th Cir. 
2011) (“It is a fairly difficult question, however, it also is a question that we need not answer 
today.”)). 
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ing times.217  The further courts move towards a broad scope and ex-
pansive police discretion when applying this exception, the less value 
the Fourth Amendment has to an individual’s right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Jacqueline K. Iaquinta
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217 United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
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